On the Nature of Subjective Consciousness

 

 

 

Rene Karamians

 

 

 

 

Abstract

               

In any study concerning the nature of subjective consciousness, it is important to first recognize the bicameral nature of the subjective mind. The problem of subjectivity becomes far less complicated when one gains insight into the idea that subjective consciousness might be a combination of two important characteristics of the mind, namely, the waken-state, and intelligent understanding. In this paper I will attempt to describe both of these characteristics and show how they both play an important role in the overall phenomenon of subjective consciousness.

 

 

Subjective Consciousness

 

It has thus far proven a difficult task indeed to describe the nature of subjectivity (or subjective consciousness) without first gaining insight into the bicameral nature of the subjective mind. It should be clear at this point, that prior to any subjectivity there needs be first a waken-state. A state in which the central nervous system (CNS) is “awake”, or rather ready to obtain and interpret sensory data. Also prior to subjectivity, there needs be a certain level of intelligence which will give the waken CNS the ability to retain and interpret sensory data in such a way which will give rise to subjective consciousness (or subjectivity). What I am suggesting is that the waken-state acts as a medium in which intelligence can reside and give rise to subjectivity. Without insight into this dualistic system any study of subjective consciousness would be difficult if not impossible, for one would be attempting to study two separate phenomena as one system.

           

The current model which accounts for the waken-state of the CNS describes the mental state as a function of the synaptic firing of the rather widespread reticular neurons. Specifically, it describes the reticular activating system (RAS), which is located within the central core of the medulla oblongata, the pons and the midbrain core, as the cause of the waken-state of the CNS. RAS neurons can be found within the hypothalamus, the thalamus, the cerebellum and even within the cortex. The widespread nature of these neurons and the rate at which they fire would indicate that the RAS could have much to do with cerebral cortical alertness. The reticular formation is also responsible for the “filtering out” of sensory data. Without this portion of the brain the cortex would be bombarded by sensory information rendering the subject incapable of effective interaction with the external environment. This “filtering out” of trivial sensory data occurs when various mechanisms within the RAS dampen the impulses which are too “weak” to reach the cortex. Those impulses which are “stronger” can easily overcome the dampening effects of the RAS and can pass through to the cortex (Marieb, 1998). It would seem that one of the more important factors involved in whether an impulse reaches the cortex or not, is the time in which the external stimuli presents itself to the subjective mind. Studies show that stimuli that appear for less then 1/25 of a second are never reported to the cortex, and therefore never consciously observed. However, if the stimulus is presented for more then 1/25 of a second the impulse reaches the cortex and the phenomenon presenting itself is observed subjectively (Walker, 2000).

           

However, there is more to subjective consciousness then simply the waken-state. We can easily assert this due to the simple fact that other species exist, who exhibit a waken CNS, but are clearly not subjectively conscious. Therefore the question remains, “what is the nature of subjective consciousness?” We can most likely find a correlation between subjectivity and higher cognitive ability.

 

The higher human cognitive ability, allows first and foremost, for physical storage space for data and the recollection of that data through a memory. However, more importantly, the human mind has the ability for reasoning. This type of thinking is due to the portion of the brain which allows for tool usage and symbolic thought, namely the neo-cortex. It is rather unclear as to how this type of cognitive ability occurs within the cortex, however, the problem was first brought to light by Roger Penrose, a Cambridge mathematician, who pointed out that the human mind uses unknown methods to ascertain certain types of mathematical truths. Put simply, humans do not necessarily use a known algorithm, as computers do, to solve mathematical problems. Therefore, there are mechanisms within the mind which are unaccounted for (Searle, 1997). However, a description of the nature of this ability is not necessary for a theory of subjective consciousness. Only a description of the symptoms, or rather, the emergent properties of the phenomena are needed. 

 

With the symptomatic effects of this type of intelligence, proceeding the waken-state, comes an entirely new phenomenon, namely, a way of observing and being aware of, the external and even inner psychical world. With intelligence and a waken-state, comes not only, the ability for language, which allows for inner thought (Dennett, 1991), but more importantly, subjectivity through the understanding of the idea of “self” (which occurs through the rational understanding of the body and the inner psyche). Studies have shown that any damage to the frontal lobe of the cortex causes a loss of the sense of “self”. In cases such as these, subjects exhibit behavior without awareness of their actions. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the idea of “self” is simply an understanding of the body and mind through use of the intelligence portion of the brain, the cortex, to understand the idea of “selfness” (Ornstein, 1992).

 

Also, intelligence in combination with the waken-state allows for an understanding of the relationships which exist between the “self” and all external phenomena. This idea is not that far deviated from the idea of “intentionality” which was first proposed by Edmund Husserl (1937). With the emergence of the ability to intentionally relate to external objects, which again occurs through intelligence, external phenomena no longer appear as vague shadows, as they would be through the eyes of the waken mind alone. The mind becomes subjective and with this subjectivity external objects begin to have meaning to the observer. Primordially, a large rock might be seen as a chair and used as such. A branch can be a walking stick and a large mammalian bone can be used as a weapon. The waken-brain, coupled with intelligence can now understand external phenomenon not only as they might relate to each other but more importantly as they relate to the self. The waken-brain and intelligence gives rise to subjective consciousness just in this way.

 

In his book Theory of Religion (1973), Georges Bataille describes the human emergence from what he calls “animality” to a more “utilitarian” existence. He describes the animal state as having a certain “continuity” which is lacking in the utilitarian state. This continuity Bataille is referring to is the lack of, what I would call, “boarders” which, for us, exist between external phenomena. In the utilitarian state, we see the object and we can detect where the object begins and were it ends, however, to the animal, external phenomena have no meaning and therefore, objects have no begging and no end. The utilitarian state is, what I have called, the subjective state, or the state of subjective consciousness, while the animal state, is what I have called the waken-state, in which the organism is awake but lacks the intelligence to obtain intentional relationships. The emergence from animality (or the waken-state alone) into the utilitarian existence (or subjective consciousness) can easily be traced back through time by observing the evolution of the human brain.

 

 

The Evolution of Subjectivity

         

Evolution of the Waken-state

 

          From an evolutionary prospective, it is clear that the wake-state must have evolved first, due to its position within the reptilian brain. There are two possible ways in which this could have occurred. In the first model, the trait simply appears and proliferates due to its immense level of fitness. The advantage of this type of mental state would most likely have been the ability to react to the external environment in an entirely new way. An organism armed with a waken brain would no longer be at the mercy of the environment. Unlike bacterial, amoeboid and vegetative organism, the waken organism would be able to react to climatic conditions much faster, would be better fit to find food, and would be able to better circum navigate dangerous obstacles. The evolution of a waken brain would also have opened the floodgates for new sensory organs such as the eye, which would have caused further proliferation of both the primordial CNS and the wake-state.

           

In the Second model, CNS proliferation is driven by the fitness of sensory organs. The gift of sight for example is a great fitness, however, with an underdeveloped CNS it would be of little use. In his book Climbing Mount Improbable (1996), Richard Dawkins describes the evolution of the eye as something of an inevitability. According to Dawkins, all that is required for and organ such as the eye to develop and proliferate, is a small-pigmented area on the surface of any given organism coupled with a crude way to detect the heat emitted from the photons collected by the pigmented area. Even a simple mechanism such as this, would increase the fitness of an organism to such an extent, that it would not take long for the trait to proliferate and develop into an advanced and more modern eye. However, since organs such as the eye, are only as good as the CNS which detects them, it would be likely that the development of the CNS could have been driven by the fitness of the early sensory organs and would have eventually become “awake”.

           

Animality: the waken-state lacking intelligence

 

            Regardless of how the waken-state developed, after it’s appearance life on earth would have gone through profound changes. Though there would have been no true subjectivity as is observed in organisms with higher cognitive ability, there would have been much room for the development of fixed-action patterns, reflexes and instincts. This is the first stage of the development of the Freudian Id. At this stage, an organism would act purely by instinct guided by chemical reactions occurring within the body. In this state, an organism would exist as an automaton. When confronted by danger it would obey, as the preprogramming of evolution would demand, however, it would experience nothing.

 

At the second stage, to allow for more complex behaviors such as monogamy, the limbic system would evolve. At this stage, most of the physical requirements for emotion would exist, however, with a lack of intelligence, there would be no awareness of self and therefore no emotion. Studies show that electrical stimulation of the amygdala, a small oval shaped inclusion within the limbic system, at times, activated intense fear in house cats and other chordates (Sagan, 1977). However, subjects involved in this study only presented the behavioral symptoms of fear. This is not at all in accord with the subjective experience of fear as observed in humans, for the subjective experience of fear would first require the cognitive ability to understand the idea of “self”. Studies concerning visual self recognition show that the lower IQ of human infants renders them incapable of understand the idea of “self” (Bahrick,1996). The same would hold true for lower animals. Without the understanding of the idea of “self”, there would be no room for the subjective experience of emotions, such as fear, in the sense of “I fear”, for example. In the case of lower animals, therefore, there would be no “emotion” but rather the mechanisms which cause the behavioral symptoms of emotion. Therefore, that which we call “emotion” in lower chordates or even higher chordates who simply lack all cognitive ability, can be reduced to a simple behaviorism in the tradition of Gilbert Ryle (1949).

 

The Evolution of Human Intelligence

               

                The evolution of intelligence is a rather interesting story. Though intelligence is a rather fit trait to say the least, it would seem that without some other selection pressure driving it, it would not have developed to the extent it has in humans. Early hominids only required enough intelligence to make and use simple tools. However, in humans, intelligence has somehow developed to such an extent, that modern man can effectively describe various phenomenon extending from gravity to “being”. Why is it that evolution was able to over develop such an “expensive” portion if the body?

           

In his book The Evolution of consciousness (1991), Robert Ornstein describes the over evolution of intelligence in man. The model proposes that after the appearance of Homo erectus, the thermodynamics involved with the human body were not quite perfected. The new erect posture seemed to cause the overheating of the brain and led to large numbers of CNS neuronal death. The evolutionary response to this selection pressure was most likely the development of a larger CNS, which became a fit trait. As the overall size of the brain increased, the cortex would have grown proportionally and hence intelligence would have increased without ever being directly selected for. With the development of the cortex, and the excessive proliferation of intelligence in man, subjective consciousness was born. A new kind of organism armed not only with an awaken brain and intelligence but subjectivity.

           

            Dream states: intelligence lacking the waken-state

 

            We have seen how the waken-state coupled with enough intelligence can lead to a subjectivity and awareness most philosophers and cognitive scientists refer to today simply as “consciousness”. However, though the continuity of intelligence, that is the continuity of the brains ability to, understand, retain and recall information, is limited only to the amount of nutrient rich blood delivered to the cortex, the continuity of the waken-state, on the other hand, is simply limited. The answer to the question as to why the waken-state can only last for short spurts lasting from 48 to 96 hours (before physical damage begins to occur) is not yet science. However, in his piece King Henry IV (act 3, scene 1) (1597), Shakespeare, quite accurately, referees to sleep as “natures soft nurse” making a reference to the replenishing effects of sleep. After extensive research, it would seem that sleep is a rather complex activity involving various different stages. However, the main objective seems to be to some how restore and replenish something that is lost during the waken-state.

           

However, there is something even more interesting involved with the “non-waken-state” (or sleep) then the evolutionary reasons for it’s existence. It would seem that during the sleep-state, certain portions of the brain remain active causing what we call “dreams”. Within the scheme of this model, dreams can be seen simply as thoughts the intelligent mind never had a chance to think during the waken-state. The dream-state, is simply the intelligent, subjective mind continuing on while the waken-state, is lacking. If this is indeed the case, it would be consistent with Freudian psychology to consider dreams as a window to the inner psyche, since dreams would reveal inner inhibitions.

 

 

Freud and Psyche

           

            To overlap this model with the Freudian scheme, it is evident that the waken-state, along with all the human instincts and drives, would be consistent with the Freudian idea of the id, that intelligence would be consisted with the Freudian idea of the super ego, while the Freudian ego, in many ways, would be consistent with the subjectivity obtained by the coupling of the all three properties.

           

            Within the Freudian scheme, the id represents the animal portion of the psyche. This animality represented by Freud’s id, is similar to the instincts, fixed-action patterns and drives, which evolved prior to intelligence (or more specifically, during the reptilian and early mammalian evolutionary stages of the brain). These two portions of the brain are where the human drives, instincts and emotions, such as the human sex drive and love, arise. Evolutionarily they developed, prior to subjective consciousness, to cause both simple and complex behaviors.

           

            The Freudian super ego, on the other hand, would be best represented by intelligence. As the super ego suppresses the id, so does intelligence suppress the animal-like human instincts and drives. One of the first things children are taught during their social development is that certain behaviors are not appropriate at specific times. For example, at various times certain stimuli may trigger sexual responses in the human male, however, through intelligent understanding (namely the understanding of the repercussions of the action) the subject can consciously inhibit the instinct which evolution has programmed.

 

And finally, the waken-state and human instincts, in combination with intelligence, would give rise not to the Freudian ego, necessarily, but to the prerequisite to that which will give rise to the ego, namely, the subjective mind. It is clear that ones personality cannot be accounted for simply by stating that it is caused by the interaction of, human instincts and the waken-state, with intelligence. To accurately account for the totality of ones personality, or ones ego, would require the review of ones past experiences, the levels of the various chemicals within the brain which effect behavior, phylogenetic history, etc. Such a study would be rather difficult to carryout. However, as far as the nature of subjective consciousness is concerned, the model holds rather well.

           

 

Conclusion

 

                Contemporary descriptions of “consciousness”, such as that of Daniel Dennett presented in his major work Consciousness Explained (1991), reduce human subjectivity to simple behaviorism. These types of descriptions not only disassemble humanity and refute centuries of philosophical works, which have held so well over the years, but also fail to account for mental states. Therefore, it is counterproductive to pursue these avenues. However, the model presented in this paper, not only leaves room for mental states, but also holds in harmony with modern philosophy.

             

 

 
 
 
 
Bibliography

 

 

 

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Sagan, C. (1977). The Dragons of Eden: Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence. New York: Random House inc. pp 64. 

 

Shakespear, W. (1597). King Henry IV: Aylessbury: Hazell Watson & Viney Ltd. pp 231.

 

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Walker, E. (2001). The physics of consciousness: Quantum mind and the meaning of life. New York: Perseus Publishing. pp 206-207.